May 30, 2026: As if Russia didn’t have enough problems in Ukraine, it’s emerged that the Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s assistants, advisors and staff are hiding or downplaying what is actually happening with the economy from the Ukraine War and being deceived by the growing Ukrainian victories and the plummeting morale of Russian soldiers. Desertions are up and instances of Russian suicides among distraught solders more frequent. Families of soldiers complain that they are having problems getting the corpses of their sons for burial. Now all parents often receive their child’s head. The war is now in its fifth year with the Russians losing and Ukrainian forces regaining territory that cost Russia over a million casualties to conquer.

After fighting a war against Ukraine longer than it took the Soviet Union to defeat the Nazis, Russia is confronted with a cascade of worsening military, economic, and political problems. The Russian President chooses to deal with these problems in a style amazingly evocative of the last years of the Soviet Union. Back during the 1941-45 Great Patriotic War, few errors were acknowledged and these were dealt with by shooting unsuccessful officers in order to inspire the others. Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains power by using long-time associates to run the FSB/Federal Security Service, the MFA/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Rostec, the nation’s major manufacturer of weapons and military equipment.

Currently, what matters most to Russian civilians is the deplorable state of the economy. After four years of spending too much on the military, the economy is distorted and unable to produce what the Russian people want and need. Before the war military spending was 4.3 percent of GDP. In 2022 the GDP was $1.8 trillion, and 4.5 percent was military spending. In 2023 it declined to $1.7 trillion, 5 percent military and in 2024 grew to $1.75 trillion, 5.2 percent military. Last year it was $1.8 trillion, 5.3 percent military and this year is expected to reach $1.85 trillion, 5.4 percent military. The stagnant GDP growth is due to the economic sanctions imposed by NATO nations and the economic distortions caused by all the military production that pushed aside manufacturing of commercial and industrial items.

Russia has descended into a stubborn recession while Putin refuses to reduce federal expenditures as he expects oil revenue to increase because of the Strait of Hormuz blockade. This plan isn’t working due to constant Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil depots and refineries.

And then there is the internet slowdown and shutdown. This created enormous public outrage. The government insists these limitations are needed to block terrorist communications but clearly does not grasp the economic costs of rolling back digitalization, which has become crucial for running a business, principally in Moscow. Bloggers may be a tiny minority in the complex urban social organization, but their outraged voices have a major impact

The emotional exhaustion caused by the Ukraine War is creating a desire for change among Russians. These sentiments are heightened by diminished prospects of a peace deal, which has apparently slid down in the list of American priorities. Russia’s partisan reporters’ primary proposition is to muster greater resources to turn the tide in stalemated battles. Putin is unwilling to incur the economic and political costs of such an escalation. Putin has stopped meeting with senior generals and Defense Ministry officials, who are taught to keep creating accounts of victorious advances. Civilians soon learn that these victories were undone by victorious Ukrainian drone warfare as reported on the internet and social media. That is why Putin wants to curb the use of the internet and social media in Russia.

Most Russians’ appeals to Putin are begging rather than demanding. Public anger is aimed at his ministers, generals, and governors who are not telling him the whole truth about increasing problems. Attempts to attract the benign attention of the leader are typical in autocratic political culture, which in Russia is reinforced by a long monarchist tradition. Putin may find comfort in this still solid credit of public confidence, but must worry about the next phase, his loyal subjects’ finding that he has little power to address their troubles and does not really want to hear about them. Putin’s reading of Russian history is selective and superficial, but he should remember at least a few of its many records of absolute rulers swiftly turning into reviled losers. Procrastination is often a wise political choice, except when troubles are brewing and time is running short.