April 27, 2026: Iranians have been under internet blackout for 55 consecutive days as connectivity flatlined at two percent of normal levels. Restrictions on global network access continue to hinder online commerce, payment systems and digitally dependent sectors of the economy.

In early January after nearly two weeks of protests in Iran, government leaders enacted an internet blackout. There were extensive telephone and internet blackouts in the capital, with added disruptions reported in the cities of Isfahan, Lordegan, Abdanan, parts of Shiraz, and Kermanshah. CyberWar specialists reported that Iran's National Information Network was also fully disconnected, even internally within Iran.

Although the blackout had been diminished on 28 January, severe limitations were still maintained. The Iranian Minister of Communications recognized that the shutdown was costing the economy $35.7 million a day. In April, another official anticipated that the direct cost of the shutdown was between $30-40 million per day, and that adding indirect costs makes the true impact closer to $70-80 million per day. Online sales fell by 80 percent during the Internet shutdown, while the Tehran Stock Exchange overall index lost 450,000 points over a four-day period, and $1,677,000,000. In January 2026, the number of financial transactions in Iran had dropped by 185 million.

The Internet blackout, which initially did not affect satellite internet connections like Starlink, has expanded efforts to shut down the Starlink internet, alongside operations to seize satellite dishes to hinder access to the Internet. The Internet blackout has been described as an attempt by the government to cover up the 2026 Iran massacres.

As of 16 February, internet traffic levels in Iran were reduced by half. At the same time internet prices increased by 18 percent, bringing the total increase to 52 percent.

Following the 28 February Israeli American attacks on Iran, there was a renewed nationwide internet blackout in Iran, as Western internet experts reported internet connectivity in Iran dropping to 4 percent the usual activity of ordinary levels. Overseas Iranians abroad admitted that they could not communicate with relatives in Iran or connect with the Iranian intranet. In early March, internet traffic was calculated at about one percent of the usual connectivity.

By late April, the shutdown had entered its 53rd consecutive day, making it the longest national internet disruption recorded worldwide. Iranian technicians began restoring the internet to elite users, while most of the population remained without access to the internet. As of mid-April, it was projected that the shutdown had cost the economy $1.8 billion. Internet connectivity remained at extremely limited levels, restricting access to autonomous information sources. In the second week of April, Iranian internet experts admitted that there was no firm schedule for reinstating the internet.

Back in February Iran emerged from its self-imposed internet blackout that was used as part of an effort to curb anti-government protests. That January 8-28 blackout was more extreme than any nation had ever endured. Mobile networks, text messaging services, landlines were disabled and Starlink was blocked. When a few domestic services became available, the government removed specific social features, such as comment sections on news sites and chat boxes in online marketplaces.

What remained operational, for a while at least, was the government controlled and monitored national Intranet. This system was only available inside Iran and users could not use it to contact anyone outside Iran without government permission and monitoring. The current system prevents Iranians from using VPNs or special SIM cards for phones to communicate. Also blocked are chat functions in nonpolitical apps like ridesharing or shopping platforms. Any channel that allows two people to exchange text is seen as a threat. Then there was shortwave radio, which has limited range and

The Iranian government has its priorities, and information control is more important than a functioning economy, growing poverty and the ability of Iranians to assemble to protest government policies or use the internet to discuss these problems with other Iranians or the outside world.

All this suppression came under attack at the end of February when the United States, Israeli and a few other nations declared war on Iran. If the current Iranian government collapses, the attacking coalition should promise prompt revival of internet and messaging service throughout the country. Many Iranians have discovered that the internet is something worth fighting and dying for. A post war Iranian communications net could also benefit from the addition of technologies that are harder to whitelist or block, such as mesh networks and D2C/Direct 2 Consumer technologies that bypass the choke points of state-controlled ISPs/Internet Service Suppliers.