Bold in its thesis, self-confidence, and capitalization (War throughout is preferred to war), Andrew Lambert’s arresting book comes richly supplied with encomia, and will doubtless win favourable reviews, which encourages me to offer some caveats. Lambert finds a management of Europe by Britain in the shape of a system devised by Wellington and the use of an ‘Offshore Balance’ that was capable of preventing the risk of French invasion, notably by securing the Scheldt, as well as preserving a stable balanced European system. The restraint of France is seen as a key element, with sustaining naval superiority in the face of technological change a vital means. Lambert takes the story on to consider concern about Antwerp’s defensiveness prior to 1914 and the lack of a national strategy in 1914. The German capture of the Belgian coast that year is presented as ‘a geo-strategic disaster of the first magnitude’ that apparently reflected the army’s failure to understand Wellington’s ‘strategic concept for the Low Countries, and the critical role of the Flemish ports in British policy’. Failure is seen anew in policy from 1919 with a focus then ‘on the negotiations of Castlereagh rather than the strategic insight of Liverpool, Wellington and the admirals… The British attempted to “order” without recognising the need for power’.

So much assurance in an author, as well as ‘Principles of British Strategy’ that could apparently provide insurance. Yet, it is always worrying then the significant gaps (not that everything can ever be covered) are matched by sections that are questionable. The former includes an adequate treatment of the period 1871 to 1904 to match that of the earlier section. The latter includes the grasp of the situation prior to 1793. For example, having emphasised the threat of French invasion (and ignored that from Spain as in 1588 and 1719), Lambert argues that Britain had done by upholding a European order ‘that kept Belgium beyond French control’. This is a surprising view given France’s conquest of it in 1744-8, which contrasted with the Anglo-Dutch neutrality in 1733-5 that was matched by France not attacking Belgium, instead focusing on fighting the Austrians in Italy and, to a lesser extent, the upper Rhineland. In the Seven Years’ War, France’s alliance with Austria led to British anxieties about the possibility of French use of the Flemish ports, while in the War of American Independence, the Dutch were linked with France from 1780.

As a separate point, Dunkirk played a greater role than the Scheldt in British discussion in the early eighteenth century, and earlier was briefly under English rule. There is also the surprising remark, with reference to 1815, about ‘long-standing British concerns about the “balance of power”, dating back a century to Lord Bolingbroke and David Hume’ (p. 110). Let us ignore the misdating of Hume’s contribution. More pertinently, ideas of the balance long predated Bolingbroke, while the concept itself, like much else, suffered from the conflation of analysis and rhetoric.

More generally, there is on the part of Lambert the habitual historians’ practice of finding solutions in his own area of interest, in this case navalism, and notably investment in infrastructure and the capacity for, and usage of, naval deployment. These indeed were very important, but are pushed too far to support a schema that underplays differences between ministries and moments. Lambert takes advantage of the longevity of both the Liverpool ministry and Wellington to emphasise continuity, but he offers too much on that head as on the Scheldt, and the last is particularly unfortunate in his bolt from 1870 to 1914. What is an important work on the situation in the decades after 1815, more particularly up to and including the 1850s, is mistitled and, in intellectual and commercial terms, mis-sold. Not that that will prevent ecstatic reviews by those who are captured by such methods and by authorial assurance.

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Our Reviewer: Jeremy Black, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Exeter, is a Senior Fellow of the Center for the Study of America and the West at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is the author of an impressive number of works in history and international affairs, frequently demonstrating unique interactions and trends among events, including The Great War and the Making of the Modern World, Combined Operations: A Global History of Amphibious and Airborne Warfare, and The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon. He has previously reviewed The Boundless Sea, On a Knife Edge. How Germany Lost the First World War, Meat Grinder: The Battles for the Rzhev Salient, Military History for the Modern Strategist, Tempest: The Royal Navy and the Age of Revolutions, Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare, Sing As We Go: Britain Between the Wars, Maritime Power and the Power of Money in Louis XIV’s France, Empireworld: How British Imperialism Shaped the Globe, Why War?, Seapower in the Post-Modern World, Mobility and Coercion in an Age of Wars and Revolutions, Augustus the Strong, Military History for the Modern Strategist, The Great Siege of Malta, Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation, Superpower Britain, Josephine Baker’s Secret War, Captives and Companions. A History of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Islamic World, War and Power: Who Wins Wars—and Why, and The Pacific’s New Navies.

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Note: No More Napoleons is also available in e-editions.

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